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ABSTRACT 
 
Do foreign aid flows respond to signals of need? This thesis explores the potential 
relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid donations. I argue that one-sided 
violence operates as a signal to the international community, indicating that a state is in need 
of aid. Utilizing foreign aid as a means of understanding international response, I execute a 
series of empirical tests to establish if such a relationship can be confirmed. While conclusive 
determination of the relationship was not obtained, I provide the foundations for future 
avenues of research for one-sided violence and foreign aid. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction 
What causes a state to increase aid flows in a given area at a given point in time? In this 
thesis, I theorize on the role of unintentional signaling caused by domestic crisis(es). For the 
purposes of this argument I examine one-sided violence as representative of domestic crisis, 
and so speculate on the potential reaction from the international community, as measured by 
official development aid flows. I will then perform a series of empirical tests in order to 
investigate whether a relationship does exist between one-sided violence and foreign aid.  
As the body of research on conflict and civil unrest continues to grow, new conceptions 
of peace-seeking policy practices and extracurricular government activities have continued to 
emerge. However, a largely neglected area of study has been that of one-sided violence. Such 
events have typically been catalogued as side effects instead of being considered as 
intentional acts in war. Despite this perspective of understanding one-sided violence, the 
ideas set forth by Raphael Lemkin have slowly pushed forward (Lemkin 1944; Kalyvas 
1990; Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004). In contrast to the former viewpoints, these 
researchers took on addressing one-sided violence in terms of other, potentially larger, 
unintended outcomes. In this paper I address one of those possible outcomes as an 
unintentional signaling event to the international community, indicating a state in need of aid 
or intervention. This means of communication is the fundamental chore of a signal. 
Examining one-sided violence in the context of an unintended signal implies new 
avenues of research. A direct relationship has been observed between one-sided violence and 
conflict (Eck & Hultman 2007; Eck & Wallensteen 2004; Sundberg 2009), and still many 
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theories to be made from the understanding of that dynamic. Furthering this path of 
speculation, I investigate a new potential relationship: the connection between foreign aid 
and one-sided violence. The expectation of foreign aid inflows to “surge” following incidents 
of one-sided violence does not require any stretch of the imagination (Elbadawi, Kaltani & 
Schmidt-Hebbel 2008). Such events may indicate a sudden increase of domestic strife to 
donor nations, and in turn those donors may be expected to respond with foreign aid as a 
salve for the recipient’s troubles. 
Foreign aid and conflict are not new subjects of analysis in international relations. The 
correlation has been examined from a myriad of theoretical foundations, with the relationship 
confirmed and confirmed again. The spectrum of study among foreign aid and conflict is 
broad. To offer direction for my theory, I examined the work of Svensson (1999), who 
executed a game-theoretical assessment of the relationship between conflict and rent-seeking 
behaviors. His findings indicated that there exists a correlation between domestic rent-
seeking and increased foreign aid. In the theory for this thesis, donor self-interests are how 
donor states interpret the signal communicated by incidents of one-sided violence. Using 
ideas drawn from his research, I discuss international rent-seeking as a reaction to one-sided 
violence. In following chapters, I will expand upon this connection further. 
These two concepts (foreign aid and one-sided violence) meet when the final component 
is included: recipient need. While there are many conflict-ridden areas across the globe, an 
exceptional event may be required to occur in order for potential donors to perceive the need 
of increased aid. To be clear: I do not assume humanitarian aims of such donations. In the 
underdeveloped regions of the world, ongoing conflicts are commonplace, and I do not argue 
that signaling need is inspiring humanitarian behaviors. Civil wars may go on for decades. 
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For example, see the case of the Colombian government, which has battled the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) since 1964 (Kruetz 2007). In cases such as these, I argue 
that the choice of foreign aid donation would require a volatile triggering event: something 
that indicates a disruption of normal events leading to increased unrest, and thus a potential 
opportunity for rent-seeking. This is a connection that I will further expand upon later in this 
thesis. 
Arguing that incidents of one-sided violence serve as a signal of a disruption in the 
recipient’s domestic norm, I theorize that donor states will engage in rent-seeking behaviors 
in order to gain influence following incidents of one-sided violence. From this I test for a 
relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid flows. Recent evidence shows that 
such rent-seeking behavior has been a continuing problem in developing nations, particularly 
during periods when a state finds itself economically flourishing (Svensson 1999). My theory 
questions: if such events are common domestically, is it possible that there are paralleled 
behaviors at the international level? Using foreign aid as representative of a donor state’s 
investment in their own self-interests, I further ask, if foreign aid, as the wide body of 
literature shows, is largely unsuccessful at realizing its goals of development and stability in 
an area, why then do these money streams continue?  
 
In this paper I pose the following question: if the assumption of donor-state interests (and 
therefore lack of altruism) holds true, and so too does the evidence indicating the lack of (or 
limited) effectiveness of foreign aid (Easterly 2003; Martens 2005) what incentives do donor 
states have to give aid beyond humanitarian motives? I focus on one-sided violence as a 
triggering signal of opportunity, and expect that there will be a surge in foreign aid as the 
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self-interested donors attempt to benefit from these cases. Ascribing the relationship between 
one-sided violence and foreign aid to this logical foundation, I empirically test the existence 
and stability of this relationship.  
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CHAPTER 2. OVERVIEW OF ONE-SIDED VIOLENCE 
 
Why One-sided Violence? 
Within the theory seen in Chapter 4, I outline the theoretical foundations that make up 
this thesis. However, in examining one-sided violence as a signal, it is necessary to 
understand that such events are not the only potential signals. Nor are they the only means 
for a state incurring crises to increase aid flows. While there may be many reasons for the 
relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid, it is the relationship that I will 
measure, and not the signaling function. In this argument, one-sided violence was chosen as a 
variable based on its exceptional nature to the international community. These events are 
generally well known, and the armed versus unarmed dichotomy may be considered a prime 
example of circumstances signaling a need of external aid. For this reason, I chose to 
examine one-sided violence as a means of understanding the signaling nature of domestic 
unrest, when examining changes in aid flows. 
 
Current Literature 
Literature on the aggregate effects of one-sided violence is still in its infancy. Currently, a 
wealth of information exists concerning the solitary incidents of one-sided violence. From 
small events to large-scale incidents such as mass killing or genocide, most of these studies 
analyze the individual case and offer prescriptions for reconciliation and future prevention. 
Anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists alike have provided case studies of 
civilian massacres ranging from Darfur to Cambodia to Peru. Very little research has been 
done on one-sided violence as a broader concept, one that envelops smaller-scale civilian 
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killings by armed groups. Even fewer papers have been written utilizing aggregate data of 
any sort (Valentino, Huth, & Balch-Lindsay 2004; Eck, Sollenberg & Wallensteen 2003).  
     Many references to one-sided violence are made in passing, categorizing the events 
among the normal side-effects of warfare. However, since Raphael Lemkin coined the term 
“genocide” in 1944, a vein of academic research has trickled forward in the studies of one-
sided violence. Rather than observing such events as the solitary actions of extremists or 
small bands of revolutionary guerrillas, increased awareness resulted in further attention 
being brought to these rare occurrences, with the objective of better understanding their 
causes and consequences. This has allowed for the creation of a new dataset concerning 
incidents and fatalities of one-sided violence, used in this thesis (Kavalyas 1999; Lemkin 
1944). 
 
Defining One-sided Violence 
I define one-sided violence as the deliberate aggression by whole or representative part, 
of an armed, organized body against unarmed civilians, which results in death tolls 
amounting to 25 or more. To be clear: I am examining one-sided violence as an unintended 
signal. There may be any number of functions performed by one-sided violence, and there 
may be any number of other mechanisms that operate to establish a relationship between one-
sided violence and foreign aid inflows. For the purposes of this thesis I will specifically draw 
theory that examines one-sided violence in the role of a signal. Using this understanding to 
study one-sided violence, I rely heavily on the perceived incentives for donor states. By this I 
mean that the international community responds to the unintended signaling of a domestic 
disturbance in the recipient state, an assumption I will discuss later in this thesis. The purpose 
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of these incidents and their subsequent social outcomes, while significant to understanding 
one-sided violence, are not the focus of this paper: I aim to address what the international 
community may interpret from these events, and gauge how potential donor states may then 
react. 
In the analysis of the data, I seek an accurate representation of the donor states’ 
perspectives of these events. As the one-sided violence data has been coded according to 
open-source material, this is an acceptable representation for what may be perceived by the 
international community. This understanding of one-sided violence also encompasses what 
Eck and Hultman (2007) defined to be “intentional and direct” assessment civilian deaths. 
Their article, One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data, 
assesses the data on one-sided violence, complied by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP). They stratify civilian deaths across four quadrants: direct and intentional, direct and 
unintentional, indirect and intentional, and indirect and unintentional (Table 1). The data 
compiled by the UCDP are strictly confined to those deaths that have been deemed direct and 
intentional, and therefore interpreted by this thesis to understand that these fatalities are 
recorded as a focused goal of the aggressor.    
Table 1. Typology of Violence against Civilians in War 
 Intentional Unintentional 
Direct One-sided violence E.g. crossfire 
Indirect E.g. starvation during siege E.g. disease 
This table comes from Eck & Hultman (2007). 
 
For the purposes of this paper, one-sided violence operates in the role of an unintended 
signal. I use this phenomenon as a representative of exceptional domestic circumstances that 
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may call the attention of the international community. For foreign aid to increase in any case, 
there must be a reason for the donor to positively alter previous norms. I argue that the 
signaling event of one-sided violence may trigger the donor states to increase aid flows to a 
recipient state. 
 
Why a signal? 
As previously stated, much of the existing literature and data record civilian death 
estimates as byproducts of warfare. Like rape, looting, and property destruction, civilian 
fatalities are largely disregarded when considering the aftereffects of such events. Beyond the 
subjects of population loss and displacement, there has been very little focused research on 
other aggregate effects of mass killing. As an unintended signal, I theorize on a different 
avenue of the effects of one-sided violence. The exploration of one-sided violence as a signal 
lends itself towards better understanding the potential larger effects of such events, and in my 
quantitative analysis I will take a first step in the attempt to ascertain if there is a reaction 
following these events. 
If one-sided violence is understood to be a signal, then there may be substantive 
responses that come to fruition following these events, and it may be possible to derive 
something new from such a study. Furthermore, there may also be new findings to be 
uncovered from pursuing the idea of foreign aid as responsive to fluctuations in domestic 
unrest. Again, I do not make the claim that the signaling function of one-sided violence is 
exclusive of all other mechanisms that may connect one-sided violence with foreign aid. This 
is an avenue of investigation that I pursue in my theory, as a function of the relationship 
between the two variables. I find the signaling operation to be reasonable for understanding 
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the fluctuations seen in foreign aid flows, and so expand upon that idea in terms of one-sided 
violence. Following this logic, I argue that violence against civilians in war can be examined 
as an unintended signal rather than simply a result of domestic unrest. It is with this in mind 
that I proceed to operationalize one-sided violence.  
 
Operationalizing One-Sided Violence 
Conceptual 
As noted above, one-sided violence is, “the use of armed force by the government of a 
state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths,” a 
definition that is derived from the UCDP. This brief definition accounts for an act in war1 that 
appears by means of politicide, democide, state-sponsored mass murder, or any other form of 
collective civilian killing2. Therefore, when operationalizing this concept for measurement, I 
assess one-sided violence as a collective act. If any members of an armed, organized group 
are committing an act (or acts) of one-sided violence, the UCDP dataset included this 
incident in the data. An exemplary case is that of the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso (Shining 
Path), who orchestrated a series of attacks on civilians throughout the 1980s and 1990s under 
the leadership of Abimael Guzmán. Guzmán dictated that mass violence be implemented as a 
strategy to inject a new social class. His slogan, “Blood will not drown the revolution, but 
water it (Starn 1995),” was indicative of his intentions throughout the duration of the Sendero 
                                                 
1
 Although I do not confine this study to one-sided violence in war, it is important to note that of the incidents 
between 1989 and 2010 as recorded by the UCDP, less than 1% were found to have occurred in states that were 
not experiencing conflict at that time (Eck & Hultman 2007). 
2
 Extrajudicial killings are excluded from the UCDP dataset. 
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Luminoso’s peak years as a powerful force within Peru. Within the UCDP-documented years, 
the Sendero Luminoso were responsible for approximately 714 deaths (Kruetz 2007).3 
 
Practical 
As previously stated, I define one-sided violence to include all mass killings by (a) 
representative(s) of a governing or organized body, wherein unarmed civilian casualties 
amount to 25 or more. While the Sendero Luminoso were not an organized group from day 
one (or throughout), the actions of its members are coded as representative of the whole. As 
per the parameters set forth by the UCDP, this manner of operationalization is consistent.  
One-sided violence is analyzed across two different measures. First is by the number of 
incidents in a given state, to examine if more incidents in a state causes a change the 
immediate aid flows. According to the theory, this is the most accurate measure of one-sided 
violence as a signal, as these individual incidents per year allow for an understanding of the 
effect of the individual events, rather than the overall casualty rates. The second means of 
measurement is by the estimate of fatalities per country year. This is based upon the UCDP 
fatality lists, which determines a low, high and best estimate of fatalities caused by direct and 
deliberate acts of one-sided violence4. Given the difference in coding for these measures, I 
choose to focus on count of incidents per country year as my primary independent variable. 
Within the parameters of this thesis, I seek to understand the potential reactions to 
signaling in the international community. Towards this end, one-sided violence is being 
studied as the signal of a recipient in need to the international community. Understanding the 
                                                 
3
 Utilizing the “best estimates” from the UCDP fatality data. 
4
 For the purposes of this study, the best estimate of fatalities was used, with high and low run to test for 
robustness. 
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methodology within the data is important in order to understand better why these events may 
be providing such a signal, as the rarity, repetition, and region of event may aid in public 
awareness surrounding one-sided violence. Within these events, there is a contrast between 
aggressors and unarmed civilians. There are not two armed forces attempting to settle a 
dispute through violent means. In these cases, the outcome may be almost predetermined by 
the use of weapons to commit violence. It is the exceptional nature of this dynamic that may 
draw the international eye to such events, to be interpreted as a signal of need (Kalyvas 1999; 
Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004). To this end, I theorize that one-sided violence 
provides a measure of signaling based on domestic discord. 
 
Limitations in Operationalization 
In practice, the UCDP dataset has demonstrated limitations within its own definition. This 
dataset was collected via free and open source information. As such, the data are based 
largely on reports by journalists, witnesses, and human rights groups. This method of data 
collection results in limited information from “severely autocratic regimes,” and events in 
detention facilities, and allows for a possible bias in fatalities offered by governments when 
pertaining to their domestic rebel groups (Sundberg 2009). In contrast to this limitation 
however, this method of collection is also extremely beneficial for this thesis, as my theory is 
largely dependent on the international awareness of such events, which is also based on this 
open source information. Therefore, the UCDP dataset provides a documentation of those 
events that have made it to domestic or international media outlets, which is an ideal situation 
for this study. 
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CHAPTER 3. OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN AID 
 
Defining Foreign Aid 
According to Lancaster, foreign aid is a voluntary transfer of resources from one 
government to another independent government, with the inclusion of at least one goal to 
improve the condition of the recipient country (2007). In this thesis, I represent foreign aid 
by the measurement of official development aid, defined by the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) as, “Flows of official financing administered with 
the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main 
objective…By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of donor government 
agencies, at all levels, to developing countries (“bilateral ODA”) and to multilateral 
institutions (OECD 2003).” While these definitions acknowledge that the purpose of foreign 
aid and official development assistance is to foster the societal or economic advancement of 
the recipient nation, in practice, such goals fail to emerge as the typical primary purpose of 
foreign aid., In the decision making process of aid donation, non-altruistic interests are 
inherent.  
From this idea comes the familiar concept of reciprocity. The existing research is clear: at 
no point does a state gift a donation of aid without an understanding of return. The 
relationship itself is power-driven: the donor possesses something that the recipient needs or 
desires. While this relationship may be maintained without any substantive exchange of aid, 
one-sided violence may operate as the signal of need, and thus trigger such a transaction. 
Following the receiving of such a signal, donor states may begin to seek out profit-gaining 
opportunities, and offer aid in order to obtain such benefts. The motivations behind giving 
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aid are often viewed with severe criticism: colonial relationships, natural resources, trading 
partners and alliances are all examples of factors that may influence a donor’s choice to give 
aid (and how much to allocate). It is these motivations that often take precedence over the 
welfare of the recipient when donors determine the allocation of aid. 
 
Current Literature 
Further evidence takes one step further in arguments for the import of donor interest over 
recipient needs. As the research of Alesina and Dollar (2000) indicates, the overall success of 
articulated aid goals have proven questionable at best. Much of the current literature on 
foreign aid critiques its effectiveness and the motivations within donor-recipient 
relationships. Empirical findings have largely concluded that aid efficacy is only maximized 
if such gifts are contingent upon the successful implementation of policy improvements that 
are predetermined within aid contracts. However, further research developed by Martens 
(2005) indicated that these aid contracts cannot be guaranteed without further investments. 
The dynamic here shows that while aid programs may be launched successfully, they do not 
necessarily or even often achieve their intended purpose, resulting in an unreliable 
investment for donor-states (Collier 2000; Williamson 2009). 
In practice, the answer to such unreliability in aid has been in the involvement of 
institutions; an attempt that has had minimal success at alleviating the concerns posed by aid 
donations. The concept is thus: if there exists an overarching body to stipulate the allocation 
of funds and execution of contracts, there should be an increased stability in aid donation. 
Again, in practice this has been met with limited success. The works of various researchers 
indicate that many foils have emerged to degrade the positive effect of these organizations. 
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Failure to hold donors accountable, the political agendas of bureaucrats, and insufficient 
funding for program goals have been documented among the many weaknesses of these 
institutions (Crawford 1997; Kang & Meernik 2004; Martens 2005; Neumayer 2003; 
Williamson 2009).  
This comprehensive documentation of missteps throughout the process of foreign aid 
donation brings to mind the question posed in the previous chapters: if these streams of aid 
have proven to offer minimal benefits to the recipient states, why do these streams continue? 
I answer that donor states are non-altruistic entities as exemplified by the discussion of aid 
effectiveness. Knowing what we do about aid effectiveness, if states were ultimately 
altruistic aid-givers, full implementation of aid goals would be pursued, and at the minimum, 
demonstrate some form of success. As the extensive research by Easterly (2000), Alesnia & 
Dollar (2000), and Balla & Reinhardt (2008) show, this is not the case. Therefore it is a 
logical conclusion that there must be continuing benefits to incentivize non-altruistic donor 
states into giving (and continuing to give) aid.  Following further examination of the 
operations in foreign aid, I will discuss rent-seeking behaviors as an undermining mechanism 
in the donor-recipient relationship. 
 
Forms of Foreign Aid and the Role of Institutions 
Foreign aid has been offered under a variety of conditions that can be categorized under 
two sets of main titles: discretionary and concessional, and bilateral and multilateral. These 
first two main forms are indicative of the strings attached to foreign aid. Discretionary aid is 
granted with the understanding that its allocation is to be directed as the recipient dictates. In 
contrast, concessional aid applies contingencies on the aid programs, dictating that the 
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funding be used for specific programs or sectors (Berthélemy 2006; Ram 2003; Williamson 
2009)5. The next pairing, bilateral/multilateral aid, requires a more in-depth look. I will also 
discuss my decision to not separate these two forms in the models seen in Chapter 5, as 
official development assistance may encompass both, as coded by the World dataBank. 
Bilateral aid (state to state) is the immediate transaction of aid from the donor to 
recipient, and the most direct form of the relationship in aid exchange. Such a donation will 
likely be dictated according to the pre-established norms between the two countries, and a 
close ally will be more likely to respond directly and substantively to a crisis within the 
borders of the recipient (Berthélemy 2006). Multilateral aid involves the use of external 
institutions to allocate funds. These institutions act as third parties to alleviate worries of aid 
being used for manipulative or exploitative purposes. However, as Berthélemy (2006), 
Martins (2004) and Svensson (1999) articulated in their individual studies, the influence of 
third-party institutions does not mitigate the influence of the donors. The inherent giver-
receiver nature of the relationship, combined with the pre-existing state of the international 
mechanisms for these financial transfers still allow the donors to gain influence over the 
proceedings (Martins 2004; Svensson 1999). Because these third-party decision-makers are 
institutions, donors (Neumayer 2003; Williamson 2009) often have an invested stake, and 
have the ability to impose or influence the decisions of recipients, based upon the strings tied 
to the aid “gift.” 
To be more specific, a paper by Williamson (2009) takes a public choice approach to 
explain the many issues of institutional involvement in foreign aid. Among the most 
                                                 
5
 Other forms of aid include food aid and technical assistance. While I would argue that these forms of aid also 
show response to the recipient’s triggers, they are not included in this study, as the manner of the measurement 
would require assessments based more upon parameters independent of those that are presented here (financial 
based, versus materials based).  
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prevalent were the ideas of old-fashioned bureaucratic incentives of budget maximization, 
and overall accountability for outcomes in the recipient state. Accountability provides an 
excellent measure for how far aid agencies will go to achieve the goals of aid projects. In 
short, there is none. While these agencies or institutions are often concentrated towards 
similar needs in the same areas, research has shown that often no body or organization is held 
responsible for failed goals (Williamson 2009). Programs may be expanded or dissolved with 
very little investigation of the cause of failure. Without these functions in place, there is no 
cost incurred for the missed deadlines and therefore the impetus behind the programs are 
subject to wane, allowing efficacy expectations to dissolve. 
Therefore, while the literature shows that there is indeed a fundamental difference 
between bilateral and multilateral aid (Alesnia & Dollar 2000; Lancaster 2007), in practice, 
the influence of the self-interested donor is not extinguished6. Given this information, I 
conclude that whether donations of foreign aid are multilateral or bilateral, aid allocations 
within the recipient state are still influenced by the donor states and therefore subject to the 
signals perceived by those nations. For the purposes of this thesis, I examine total aid inflows 
as recorded by the World Bank. 
  
Rent-Seeking 
Entities are said to be rent-seeking when they actively attempt to manipulate the 
allocation of funds towards their own gain. This idea may be applied to benefits earned 
through political, social or economic gain. It is upon this idea that I build my theory of donor 
                                                 
6
 Berthélemy  (2006) demonstrated this point in his work, which modified the foreign aid models set forth by 
Alesnia & Dollar (2000), accounting for more extensive control variables and further stratification among the 
purviews of bilateral and multilateral aid.  
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self-interests. At this point, it is important to note that though I am discussing donor self-
interests based on rent-seeking behavior, rent-seeking does not necessarily equate rent-
gaining. I do not assert achievement on the sides of the donor states; I merely state that there 
may exist an attempt to gain such benefits following the donation of aid. 
Conjecture based on the self-interested donor does not require mental acrobatics. At this 
point I am providing a more precise label for an idea that has already been thoroughly 
articulated: the expectation that donor states are inherently self-interested in their aid-giving. 
As such, I expect that the increase in aid flows may be due to the perception of increased 
incentives for donors. It is at this point that I turn to the theoretical foundation for this study, 
and offer a three-fold approach to better understanding the dynamic between one-sided 
violence and foreign aid flows. 
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CHAPTER 4. HYPOTHESIS & THEORY 
 
Hypothesis 
 In a given country year, an increase in incidents of one-sided violence  increase in foreign 
aid inflows. 
 
Foreign aid research heavily emphasizes the requirement of the donor self-interest and 
recipient-need dynamic to achieve foreign aid: in order for the donor to give, the recipient 
must indicate need or desire for such donation. Yet, how is this communication of need being 
transmitted? I will test the potential existence of such a dynamic using one-sided violence as 
signal and foreign aid as a method of tangible international response to humanitarian 
recipient needs. As I have discussed in Chapter 2, it is necessary to test initially for the 
existence of such a relationship, as I have executed in this thesis. While significant findings 
do not offer confirmation of the signaling function of one-sided violence, they do allow for 
further steps to be made toward that end. 
I assert that one-sided violence and foreign aid provide an acceptable measure for the 
donor-recipient dynamic. One-sided violence functions as a signal by acting as a domestic 
disruption, rare enough to be considered an outlier in the behaviors during war. Often, such 
events begin or signal a turn in warfare. To explain this relationship I propose that in the 
international arena, one-sided violence may be viewed as an unintentional signal to potential 
donor states, and that the state in which the event occurs is experiencing an opportunity for 
external parties to gain political and/or tangible capital. For the purposes of this thesis, I 
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examine only those cases where donor states support the government through official 
development aid.  
 
Theory 
What causes a state to offer or increase foreign aid at any given point in time? No state is 
altruistic. I assert that such decisions often involve signs of excess need in some form by the 
recipient states. Domestic unrest, such as the genocide of Darfur, Sudan, which 
unintentionally attracted China’s self-interest in oil and natural resources; or economic crisis, 
such as the current state of Greece which has seen increases in various forms of financial aid 
in order to stabilize the economy, are both examples of such signals. In this thesis, I theorize 
on the signaling function of one-sided violence as a means of the recipient-donor 
communication exchange prior to changes in aid flows. This idea presupposes that foreign 
aid is a response to signaling. Yet, nothing is automatic in the international arena. For 
clarity’s sake, I reassert that one-sided violence is fulfilling the role of an unintentional signal 
to the international community. Whether committed by rebels or governmental bodies, I do 
not claim that such acts are committed with the specific purpose of drawing in foreign aid. 
 
Through backwards induction, if it is accepted that foreign aid is largely a political 
phenomenon, then it may be assumed that a gift of foreign aid would not be invested unless a 
minimum of political benefits would be assured. What Collier describes as “rent seeking 
predation” I apply to the relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid (Collier 
2000, 2006). States are not altruistic; while there is little to no expected financial return on 
foreign aid (even in cases of loans or concessions, return is not guaranteed), a donor state 
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would be less likely to offer aid unless there are political or other tangible benefits to be 
realized. In this manner, I argue that one-sided violence opens the door for other nations to 
lobby for political power through foreign aid as they seek to increase the incentives for 
policy regulations in their favor, by the recipient state. It is not in the interest of the state to 
give away capital; however, it is in the interest of the state to offer aid in areas of the world 
where there may be a potential return for that donation. 
Easterly discussed these roles of donor requirements (2006a), stating that approximately 
75% of United States aid donations are “tied” to the requirement that the capital is to be spent 
on American products (Williamson, 2009). China has similar requirements stipulated in its 
aid contracts, as do many other aid donors. Such concessions often detract from the full value 
of aid in these recipient nations, as the restrictions restrain conservative spending. US food 
aid often requires a significant proportion of funds to be spent on transportation rather than 
food, in order to ensure the use of US produce. This is merely one example of how donor 
state interests take political precedence over the needs of recipient states.  
 
Examining the case of China, in February of 2012 the Council on Foreign Relations 
published an article titled “Expanding China-Africa Oil Ties,” that examined one method of 
how China has acquired power and resource access in Africa. Much of what the authors 
discussed was the use of “integrated aid packages” offered to a variety of African nations 
including Gabon, Sudan, and Angola, to build infrastructure and aid development within 
these states. As reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (2007), China 
further “extended a $2 billion oil-backed loan for a series of projects in Angola.” In other 
words, these aid packages offered by China were forms of concessional aid, which required 
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the implementation of policies that specifically benefitted the interests of China, often at the 
expense of the recipient population. This is a prime example of what the current body of 
literature indicates to be the flaws in the donor self-interest/recipient-need relationship. In 
these two cases, it is worth noting that Angola and Sudan both saw multiple incidents of one-
sided violence each year until 1989 (Alessi 2012). 
China provides an apt example of the expected trend discussed in this thesis. Though this 
description may seem severe, I argue that while China’s activities may be more overt, they 
are certainly not unique. I do not aim to generalize from an individual case: on the contrary, I 
use this example in order to demonstrate the factors of an expected dynamic that is argued in 
this thesis.  
 I expect that donor states always aim to maximize their payoffs, and altruistic donations 
to states in need are contrary to those aims. Subsequently, I expect that when donor states 
choose to give aid, they are in fact maximizing their payoffs, albeit with returns that may not 
be in the form of capital. With this speculation, I turn to the relationship between one-sided 
violence and foreign aid, as representative of the donor-recipient relationship. 
In this thesis I test whether events of one-sided violence are followed by sudden increases 
in foreign aid inflows to those states that experience them. Conflict-ridden states offer 
opportunity for domestic and international rent-seeking, as even the perception of possible 
aid increased can alter domestic spending and productivity (Svensson 1999). If my 
hypothesis holds true, I expect to see a surge in foreign aid following incidents of one-sided 
violence. In the next chapter, I outline the methodology and findings of these empirical tests. 
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CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY & DATA 
 
Methodology 
The data used for this thesis was extracted from Dr. Pippa Norris’s Democracy Time-
series Dataset (2009), World dataBank (2011), and the UCDP (2011). One-sided violence 
was measured across the two aforementioned methods: best estimate of total fatalities and 
number of incidents, each examined across country-year. Foreign aid was measured 
according to the World dataBank codes as, net official development assistance (ODA) as a 
percentage of GNI. In accordance with the Democracy Time-series Dataset, the collected 
data covers the years 1994-2006. 
 The objective is to investigate whether there is a significant relationship between one-
sided violence and foreign aid inflows. To measure this relationship precisely, I executed a 
series of cross-sectional time series regressions. To complicate matters, my hypothesis does 
not require the examination of a steady relationship, but a sudden change in that dynamic. In 
other words, this thesis looks for a sudden change in aid inflow among the three time 
segments (1, 3 and 5 years). To achieve the appropriate measures, I advanced my dependent 
variable (official development assistance as a percentage of GNI) the necessary years for 
each designated time segment, and calculated the change in aid flows between those times. 
This amounted to a measurement of ODA that complied with my hypothesis. The following 
variables were controlled for in the dataset, as well as the aforementioned ODA, incident and 
fatality codes. 
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The following independent variables were chosen strictly for their potential to affect 
incentives for donor states and one-sided violence, and incite the change measured in the 
ODA variable. Conventional choices for such variables were excluded because the 
hypothesis is dependent not on the direct, linear relationship between foreign aid and one-
sided violence, but on the changes in foreign aid. I am measuring the years following one-
sided violence to ascertain if there is a sudden surge in foreign aid in the recipient state. 
Therefore it is not enough to measure all states to see if one-sided violence and foreign aid 
appear at the same time, which would fulfill the expectations of the standard OLS regression. 
For this hypothesis, I investigate if there are sudden spikes in aid following such events. With 
this logic in mind, I chose the control variables based upon their potential effects given a 
change in their status (for example, regimes or institutions).  
Region was examined across seven groups: Africa, Asia, Central Europe, Western 
Europe, the Middle East, South America and North America. This variable was included as a 
proxy for regional awareness of individual events as well as cross-border involvement. 
Religion was included to address the relationships found between states with similar 
demographics and/or shared histories. Alesina and Dollar (2000) found no significance 
between religion as a percentage of population (as a proxy for cultural affinity) for bilateral 
aid or FDI, but slight (negative) significance for select religions including Hindu, Animist 
and Atheist, when examined. This unexpected result in combination with conventional 
wisdom which often states that religion will play a part in aid flows, mandates its inclusion in 
this examination. Religions were coded as dummy variables across the following categories: 
Catholicism, Islam, Orthodox and Other Religions. The Democracy Time-series Dataset 
showed missing data in the years 2005-2006 for all variables and therefore no change was 
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assumed to occur within countries for these years, as consistent with previous years in the 
given states. 
Population is defined in terms of country’s overall population, with a natural logarithm 
applied in order to account for change across the normal distribution. Colonial history was 
coded as a dummy variable, to account for the favoritism granted to such nations in terms of 
aid donations. Conflict was also included, incorporating all civil wars, that are a growing 
trend in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Civil wars were categorized based on 
internationalization, which involves the international intervention of military forces by other 
states, as well as internal, which confined aggression to the domestic armed forces. 
Polity Index as coded by Jaggers, Gurr and Marshall (2010), measures the authority 
patterns within state borders across the globe, on a scale of authoritarian (-10) to democratic 
(10), anchored in the patterns of the state regime. State structure is a fundamental element in 
both the onset and the outcome of one-sided violence. Autocracies are more inclined to be (or 
become) dictatorial and aggressive towards their own population, while democracies have 
been touted as the peace-seeking nations and therefore less conflict-prone. The latter 
assertion has been disproven across many studies due to the volatile transition required to 
achieve a stable democracy (Mansfield & Snyder 2002). For this study, the polity index has 
been included to account for changes within its measures of democracy/autocracy.  
Regime Durability as a measure is based on the polity index. This variable measures the 
most recent regime change within three years, or the completion of a transition signified by 
the lack of stable institutions. The variable examines the solidity of regimes in the short time 
period assessed by the amalgamative dataset used in this thesis. 
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Regime and Institutions were coded to determine the types of both, and examined to see 
the change in status over the indicated time segments. As these two components are often 
fundamental to the operations of the governments, I argue that fluctuations in their existence 
may be representative of domestic unrest and act on expectations of foreign aid.  
The Physical Integrity Rights Index, according to the CIRI Human Rights Data Project is 
a combined variable, consisting of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and 
disappearance indicators on a 0-10 scale (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999).  These manners of 
deaths are not coded into the UCDP dataset on one-sided violence, and controlling for their 
measures via an index is a reasonable measure of these effects. Further, this index is an 
acceptable proxy for civil unrest and government activity in the recipient nations.  
Crisis State is a count of the number of government-based crises a recipient nation incurs 
in the years indicated. Using logic parallel to that which is seen in this theory, it is necessary 
to control for such incidents in case they too offer a signal to potential donor states for rent-
seeking opportunities. Institutions were also included as a dummy variable, as an institutional 
change could be a response to one-sided violence and act on foreign aid flows independently 
of the relationship measured. 
Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in constant 2000 US$ is measured by the World 
dataBank as GNI divided by midyear population. Regressions control for a differencing in 
this value, acting on allocation of foreign aid to recipient states. All continuous measures 
were transformed to adhere to the assumption of normality in regressions.  
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Data 
For this study I ran a series of cross-sectional linear regressions with first-order 
autoregressive disturbances. Before turning to the regression outputs, I estimated a 
correlation matrix to estimate the possible relationships among the individual independent 
variables (Table 2). As presented below, there appear to be little significant correlations 
among the independent variables. The results of this matrix, which includes the entire 
dataset, conclude that few of the relationships are very strong, and those that appear to be 
significant are not unexpected, as the strongest observations are Latin America and 
Catholicism (0.908) and Regime type and Institutions (-0.861). 
 
Table 2a. 
Correlation Matrix for Study Variables           
 Incidents Africa Asia Latin CEurope MEast Polity 
Incidents per Country Year 1 - - - - - - 
Africa 0.054 1 - - - - - 
Asia 0.204 -0.304 1 - - - - 
Latin America -0.077 -0.391 -0.257 1 - - - 
Central Europe -0.118 -0.264 -0.173 -0.223 1 - - 
Middle East -0.08 -0.272 -0.179 -0.23 -0.155 1 - 
Polity 0.023 -0.222 0.136 0.462 -0.135 -0.294 1 
Colony 0.08 0.169 0.305 -0.612 0.032 0.178 -0.376 
Catholic -0.075 -0.358 -0.204 0.908 -0.183 -0.254 0.43 
Muslim 0.031 0.009 -0.059 -0.452 0.18 0.441 -0.531 
Other Religions 0.133 0.081 0.381 -0.236 -0.159 -0.071 0.126 
Internal Conflicts 0.539 0.004 0.139 -0.106 -0.134 0.107 0.014 
Internationalized Conflicts 0.003 0.004 -0.048 -0.062 0.171 -0.043 -0.125 
Durable Regime 0.078 -0.27 0.151 0.102 -0.279 0.345 -0.083 
Regime -0.044 0.366 -0.109 -0.41 -0.081 0.217 -0.77 
Institutions -0.001 -0.27 -0.02 0.577 -0.074 -0.265 0.694 
Physical Integrity Index -0.451 0.069 -0.169 0.059 0.122 -0.104 0.147 
Crisis State 0.202 -0.214 0.173 0.221 -0.11 -0.068 0.198 
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Table 2b. 
Correlation Matrix for Study Variables         
  Colony Catholic Muslim Other  Internal International  Durability  
Colony 1 - - - - - - 
Catholic -0.675 1 - - - - - 
Muslim 0.376 -0.498 1 - - - - 
Other Religion 0.550 -0.260 -0.323 1 - - - 
Internal Conflict -0.009 0.027 0.085 0.043 1 - - 
Internationalized Conflict -0.002 -0.068 0.063 0.007 -0.053 1 - 
Durability of Regime 0.072 0.069 -0.002 0.089 -0.016 -0.067 1 
Regime 0.401 -0.417 0.379 0.054 0.010 0.096 -0.024 
Institution -0.488 0.588 -0.461 0.145 -0.087 -0.086 -0.016 
Physical Integrity Index -0.102 0.022 -0.154 0.002 -0.541 -0.135 0.033 
Crisis State -0.134 0.187 -0.046 0.036 0.238 -0.014 -0.133 
Population 0.158 -0.002 0.033 0.135 0.319 -0.038 0.099 
GNI per capita 
(standardized) -0.257 0.338 -0.208 0.064 -0.087 -0.114 0.405 
 
 
Table 2c. 
Correlation Matrix for Study Variables       
 Regime Institutions Physical  Crisis  Population GNI  
Regime 1 - - - - - 
Institutions -0.816 1 - - - - 
Physical Integrity  -0.151 0.096 1 - - - 
Crisis State -0.172 0.167 -0.309 1 - - 
Population -0.054 0.018 -0.566 0.341 1 - 
GNI per capita 
(standardized) -0.242 0.262 0.166 0.087 -0.059 1 
 
Utilizing an extensive collection of cross-sectional time series regressions, I estimated a 
number of alternative models in order to investigate the proposed relationship between 
foreign aid and one-sided violence. The following tables presented are in 1, 3 and 5 year time 
segments, estimated as random-effects regressions with autoregressive (AR(1)) disturbances. 
AR(1) disturbances were confirmed as being necessary following scatterplot analysis of the 
residuals, which indicated that the disturbances among the variables were correlated.  
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As I have previously indicated, thorough consideration of the theory presented in this 
paper warranted that the focus of this research be on the measurement of incidents per 
country year, rather than on the fatality estimates of one-sided violence. What will be 
presented in this section includes only those regressions estimated using this measure. In all 
regressions, the number of observations amounted to 528, with 90 countries included from 
the dataset.  
 
Table 3. 
Changes in Foreign Aid, One Year Following (an) Incident(s) of One-sided Violence, 1994-2006
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Z-score 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Incidents of One-sided Violence  
(per country year) -0.082 0.072 -1.15 -0.223 0.058 
Africa -0.163 0.219 -0.74 -0.592 0.266 
Asia -0.304 0.223 -1.36 -0.742 0.134 
Latin America -0.392 0.314 -1.25 -1.009 0.224 
Central Europe -0.732 0.233 -3.14 -1.188 -0.275 
Polity -0.015 0.008 -1.84 -0.031 0.001 
Colony -0.017 0.037 -0.46 -0.091 0.056 
Catholic 0.026 0.270 0.10 -0.502 0.555 
Muslim -0.204 0.173 -1.18 -0.543 0.135 
Other Religion 0.162 0.223 0.73 -0.274 0.599 
Internal Civil Conflict -0.018 0.065 -0.28 -0.146 0.109 
Internationalized Civil Conflict -0.340 0.180 -1.89 -0.692 0.012 
Durability of Regime 0.006 0.026 0.23 -0.046 0.058 
Regime Type -0.449 0.129 -3.48 -0.702 -0.196 
Institution Type -0.064 0.043 -1.48 -0.149 0.021 
Physical Integrity Index 0.007 0.011  0.66 -0.015 0.030 
Crisis State -0.006 0.004 -1.41 -0.014 0.002 
Log Population -0.679 0.090 -7.58 -0.855 -0.504 
GNI per capita -0.716 0.052 -13.86 -0.818 -0.615 
Note: GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances.  R2=0.7649; Wald χ2 (df=20)= 441.87. Significance levels 
are based on a two-tailed test. 
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Note: GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances.  R2=0.088; Wald χ2(20)= 23.7. Significance levels are based on 
a two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 
Changes in Foreign Aid, 3 Years Following (an) Incident(s) of One-sided Violence, 1994-2006 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Z-score 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Incidents of One-sided Violence 
(per country year) -0.279 0.202 -1.38 -0.675 0.116 
Africa 0.355 0.293 1.21 -0.219 0.929 
Asia 0.422 0.290 1.45 -0.147 0.990 
Latin America 0.535 0.442 1.21 -0.331 1.401 
Central Europe 0.883 0.319 2.77 0.257 1.509 
Polity 0.016 0.017 0.94 -0.018 0.051 
Colony -0.015 0.051 -0.30 -0.116 0.086 
Catholic -0.137 0.385 -0.35 -0.891 0.618 
Muslim 0.269 0.231 1.16 -0.184 0.722 
Other Religion -0.130 0.313 -0.41 -0.744 0.485 
Internal Civil Conflict 0.206 0.182 1.13 -0.151 0.562 
Internationalized Civil Conflict 0.657 0.481 1.37 -0.286 1.601 
Durability of Regime 0.009 0.066 0.14 -0.120 0.138 
Regime Type 0.255 0.261 0.98 -0.257 0.768 
Institution Type 0.030 0.094 0.32 -0.154 0.213 
Physical Integrity Index -0.052 0.034 -1.56 -0.118 0.014 
Crisis State -0.017 0.013 -1.31 -0.043 0.009 
Log Population 0.054 0.132 0.41 -0.204 0.313 
GNI per capita 0.104 0.071 1.47 -0.035 0.243 
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Table 5.      
Changes in Foreign Aid, 5 Years Following (an) Incident(s) of One-sided Violence, 1994-2006 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Z-score 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Incidents of One-sided Violence 
(per country year) -0.029 0.217 -0.14 -0.454 0.395 
Africa 0.515 0.331 1.55 -0.134 1.164 
Asia 0.457 0.329 1.39 -0.188 1.102 
Latin America 0.465 0.497 0.94 -0.509 1.439 
Central Europe 0.687 0.360 1.91 -0.019 1.393 
Polity -0.007 0.019 -0.38 -0.045 0.030 
Colony -0.031 0.058 -0.53 -0.145 0.083 
Catholic -0.010 0.432 -0.02 -0.857 0.837 
Muslim 0.145 0.262 0.55 -0.368 0.658 
Other Religion -0.499 0.353 -1.41 -1.190 0.193 
Internal Civil Conflict 0.069 0.195 0.35 -0.313 0.452 
Internationalized Civil Conflict 0.808 0.512 1.58 -0.195 1.812 
Durability of Regime -0.001 0.071 -0.02 -0.141 0.139 
Regime Type 0.050 0.287 0.18 -0.513 0.614 
Institution Type -0.016 0.103 -0.16 -0.217 0.185 
Physical Integrity Index -0.026 0.036 -0.74 -0.097 0.044 
Crisis State -0.018 0.014 -1.26 -0.045 0.010 
Log Population 0.157 0.148 1.06 -0.132 0.447 
GNI per capita 0.121 0.080 1.52 -0.035 0.278 
Note: GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances.  R2=0.073; Wald χ2(20)= 23.24. Significance levels are based on 
a two-tailed test. 
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CHAPTER 6. FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
 
Findings 
Figure 1 presents the relationship between incidents of one-sided violence and the 
documented change in official development aid by one year. No significant variables at a 
95% confidence show an increased significance of one-sided violence, which is contrary to 
the presented theory. The relationship shows insignificance at a -1.15 z-score.  
In Figure 2, the effects of significant control variables have all but disappeared, and in a 
couple of cases, almost completely reversed. Central Europe, for example, which showed a -
3.17 z-score in Figure 1, now shows a score of 2.77. Latin America and Asia both 
demonstrate similar trends in their z-scores, with Regime Type showing a 0.98 significance. 
However, the theorized relationship between incidents of one-sided violence and changes in 
official development aid by three years, remains insignificant.  
Figure 3 demonstrates even further dissolution of significance across the independent 
variables, while again, the insignificance of the relationship of study, remains. Analyzing the 
effects of all three regressions together, the time series indicates that there is consistently no 
relationship shown between changes in official development assistance and incidents of one-
sided violence per country year, in the provide estimates.  
Though these findings are contrary to the presented theory, the lack of significance in the 
relationship is still informative. Conventional wisdom may often expect that the humanitarian 
element in one-sided violence may inspire some form of connection between aid flows and 
one-sided violence, which the presented models fail to confirm. Were these models failing to 
account for certain control variables, I would still expect to see a correlation, albeit weak, 
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between the dependent and primary independent variable. Despite these findings, I do not 
abandon the presented theory, and offer the following limitations as possible explanations for 
the failure to confirm the hypothesis.   
 
Limitations  
The data collected have been has informative, and as one of the largest datasets with the 
widest variety of variables, was ideal for the purposes of this study. The lack of significant 
results could be the effect of omitted variable bias, which could be an outcome of the limited 
available data, and explained below. This opens an opportunity for future research with 
different datasets that may include variables not seen in the Democracy Time-series dataset, 
or with variables coded using alternate measures. However, due to the variety (and the sheer 
magnitude, at 705 variables) in this dataset, I maintain that this provided an excellent base 
from which to launch further studies.  
With these limitations in mind, I understand that while there appears to be no significant 
relationship between one-sided violence and foreign aid in the models discussed above, the 
empirical data has much further to go before a relationship can be demonstrated, or classified 
as a relationship that has consistently provided no evidence for existence. As it stands, I 
perceive three main possibilities for why this outcome may exist.  
First, as previously stated, it is possible that omitted variable bias plays a pivotal role in 
the insignificance of these results. Future research incorporating more datasets will be able to 
confirm or reject this postulation. Recommendations for additional variables include: exports, 
natural resources as a percentage of exports, oil as a percentage of exports, and size of allied 
nations. While the variables provided by the Democracy Time-series dataset provided a 
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starting point for this theory, there are a variety of other models that may be run in order to 
confirm or deny confirmation of a relationship, the precision of which may be enhanced by 
including other datasets into the study. 
Second, while the premise of the theoretical foundation may hold true, the role of the 
unintended signaling by one-sided violence could be missing a serious component: the 
interpretation of the signal by the donor state. As I have previously stated, the body of 
research on one-sided violence is in its infancy and largely categorizes one-sided violence as 
a byproduct of war. While it may indeed be true that one-sided violence does not occur as a 
random event, what this theory depends on is the role of the donor in perceiving such events 
as non-random. Without the transmission of this signal, donors may perceive one-sided 
violence to be no more than the typical expression of the violence in war. In such a case, I 
would expect no change among the inflows of foreign aid. 
Finally, while one-sided violence is a rarity, the use of aggregate data indicates that there 
is some acceptance and interest in the concept more than a mere byproduct. The possibility 
remains that one-sided violence, by and large, is considered more normal than I initially had 
theorized. 
 
Future Research 
The role of recipient signaling may have a place in international relations theory. Much of 
the current literature discusses the imbalanced power relationship between donors and 
recipients, but signaling may allow recipients to choose what needs or activities get broadcast 
to the international system.  
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This research provides a starting point for those interested in studying the role of 
domestic crises in underdeveloped nations. Do these events have an effect? In studying one-
sided violence, I began to develop a better understanding of the implications of these matters 
for the states experiencing them. Though I failed to confirm my hypothesis, I maintain that 
the initial signaling function may still exist, and have provided a first step for future study. 
There may be further insights gleaned from examining the nuances within these domestic 
crises, such as the societal roles played by the armed group (rebels, gangs, or governments 
for example). Though Svensson indicated that foreign aid does not discriminate in terms of 
corruption, the role of identity may be more powerful than what was originally believed.  
 
Conclusions 
In this thesis, I have argued that there is a direct relationship between one-sided violence 
and foreign aid. Further, I have utilized signaling as a means by which recipient needs are 
communicated to donor states, and discussed at length the pivotal role of donor self-interests 
in these events. While the findings from this study provided few conclusive answers, the 
results did suggest that incidents of one-sided violence might be followed with behaviors 
contrary to those that may typically be expected. Such events often inspire sympathy and the 
expectation of humanitarian intervention, but in practice the results demonstrate opposite 
behaviors. Foreign aid flows appear to pause following such events, which was an 
unexpected finding. This behavior may be explained by policymakers who temporarily 
discontinue aid until such a time when recipients’ domestic affairs decrease their volatility. 
The theory presented in this thesis discussed the relationship between one-sided violence 
and foreign aid flows, utilizing signaling as a basis to better understand a possible 
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correlation. With the variables assessed, no conclusive results were uncovered, leading me to 
believe that the theory is incomplete. The contraction viewed in the one-year time segment 
did imply that there may be a measurable connection, but isolating a signaling mechanism 
may require the inclusion of other possible domestic crises in the dataset.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 6. 
Total Incidents of One-sided Violence per  
Country, 1994-2006 
 Nation Total Incidents 
  
 
Afghanistan 11 
Albania 0 
Algeria 9 
Angola 10 
Argentina 0 
Armenia 0 
Azerbaijan 0 
Bahrain 0 
Bangladesh 1 
Bolivia 0 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 3 
Botswana 0 
Brazil 1 
Burkina Faso 0 
Burundi 24 
Cambodia 4 
Cameroon 1 
Central African Republic 2 
Chad 9 
Chile 0 
China 0 
Colombia 24 
Comoros 0 
Congo, Democratic Republic o 54 
Congo, Republic of 6 
Cote D'Ivoire 9 
Croatia 1 
Cuba 0 
Cyprus 0 
Djibouti 0 
Dominican Republic 0 
Ecuador 0 
Egypt 4 
El Salvador 0 
Eritrea 0 
Ethiopia 4 
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Table 6 (continued). 
Nation Total Incidents 
Gabon 0 
Gambia 0 
Georgia 1 
Ghana 0 
Guatemala 2 
Guinea 1 
Guinea-Bissau 0 
Haiti 1 
Honduras 1 
India 47 
Indonesia 13 
Iran 0 
Iraq 8 
Israel 15 
Jordan 0 
Kazakhstan 0 
Kenya 0 
Korea, Republic Of 0 
Kuwait 0 
Kyrgyzstan 0 
Laos 0 
Lebanon 2 
Lesotho 0 
Liberia 12 
Macedonia 0 
Madagascar 0 
Malaysia 0 
Mali 3 
Mauritania 0 
Mexico 1 
Moldova, Republic Of 0 
Mongolia 0 
Morocco 1 
Mozambique 0 
Namibia 2 
Nepal 14 
Nicaragua 0 
Niger 2 
Nigeria 4 
Oman 0 
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Table 6 (continued). 
Nation Total Incidents 
Pakistan 4 
Panama Canal Zone 0 
Papua New Guinea 1 
Paraguay 0 
Peru 0 
Philippines 8 
Qatar 0 
Rwanda 9 
Saudi Arabia 2 
Senegal 5 
Sierra Leone 7 
Singapore 0 
Slovenia 0 
South Africa 1 
Sri Lanka 6 
Sudan 31 
Suriname 0 
Syrian Arab Republic 0 
Taiwan 0 
Tajikistan 0 
Tanzania 0 
Thailand 0 
Togo 0 
Tonga 0 
Trinidad & Tobago 0 
Tunisia 0 
Turkey 0 
Uganda 0 
Uruguay 0 
Uzbekistan 0 
Venezuela 0 
Yugoslavia 0 
Zimbabwe 0 
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